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79 
An Antigua Gambling Model for the  
International Tax Regime 
Adam H. Rosenzweig

 
The international tax world is facing a defining moment. While 
there is little agreement on anything else within the field, there 
appears to be a wide and deep consensus that the modern 
international tax regime—the so-called flawed miracle emerging 
from World War II—is irrevocably broken. Rich countries, poor 
countries, multinational institutions, scholars, and politicians all seem 
to agree the time is now to revisit the international tax regime and 
rebuild it from the ground up. Leading the way is the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) through its 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project, which promises to 
adopt common international principles to prevent multinational 
taxpayers from using techniques that cause their income to fall 
through the cracks without any country able to meaningfully tax it.
1
 
But the BEPS project, as well as all similar efforts, faces the 
formidable task of building a consensus without the infrastructure of 
a new institutional framework for international taxation.  
Of course, the task of developing an entirely new institutional 
framework for international tax is a major and daunting one. Rather 
than address the enormity of this entire project, this Essay will focus 
on one aspect that has received less attention as of late: even if a 
consensus around new rules can be universally agreed to, what 
happens when countries break the rules? 
 
  Professor of Law, Washington University in Saint Louis. I would like to thank the 
participants at the colloquium on “Conceptualizing a New Institutional Framework for 
International Taxation” held at Washington University on April 1, 2013, for their insights and 
discussion that made this Essay possible, as well as the Whitney Harris World Law Institute for 
sponsoring the colloquium. All errors are solely those of the author.  
 1. See generally ORG. ECON. COOP. DEV., ADDRESSING BASE EROSION & PROFIT 
SHIFTING (2013), available at www.loyensloeff.com/nl-NL/Documents/OECD.pdf [hereinafter 
OECD BEPS REPORT]. 
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This issue has proven sticky, even under the current international 
tax regime. Countries that are signatories to tax treaties often disagree 
on how to apply or interpret them. Traditionally, such treaties 
provided that the “competent authorities” of the signatory countries 
would meet and work out such differences.
2
 If the differences were 
accidental or purely technical, this would make sense. But what if the 
disagreement represents fundamental policy differences? Should the 
countries submit the disagreement to arbitration? Should the parties 
withdraw from the treaty? Should the taxpayers be involved or only 
the governments? 
These issues will only be exacerbated in any new multilateral 
framework emerging from BEPS or similar projects.
3
 To date, 
however, little attention has been paid to these issues within the 
emerging debates over a new institutional framework for 
international taxation. This Essay will address these issues, using a 
recent dispute in the World Trade Organization (WTO) between the 
United States and the tiny country of Antigua and Barbuda over 
internet gambling as a model for framing the discussion. 
To this end, Part I of this Essay will briefly describe the Antigua 
Gambling dispute and the resolution adopted by the Dispute 
Settlement Body of the WTO. Part II will then briefly describe the 
state of the modern debate over BEPS and similar projects. Part III 
will use Antigua Gambling as a thought experiment of how to build 
dispute resolution mechanisms for international tax, proposing 
several potential alternative models that could be adopted.  
 
 2. See US Model Income Tax Convention of Nov. 15, 2006 art. 25, available at 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/hp16801.pdf.  
 3. See Marie Sapirie, News Analysis: A Preview of Country-by-Country Reporting, 141 
TAX NOTES 263 (Oct. 21, 2013) (“The OECD suggests that improvements to the mutual 
agreement procedure (MAP) will complement the BEPS project. However, the MAP may not 
be quite the panacea for the uncertainty resulting from the introduction of new rules . . . . The 
introduction of a mandatory and binding arbitration provision in the existing MAP provisions in 
tax treaties could help in situations when a treaty is available. . . . [M]andatory and binding 
arbitration alone would not eliminate the uncertainty from the new rules . . . .”). 
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I. THE ANTIGUA GAMBLING DISPUTE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES 
AND ANTIGUA AND BARBUDA 
In July of 2013, the government of Antigua and Barbuda 
announced the formation of a committee to direct “the government’s 
plan to build the framework necessary to suspend selected US 
intellectual property rights . . . .”
4
 In other words, Antigua and 
Barbuda declared its intent to begin selling copyrighted songs, 
movies, and other material directly to U.S. consumers without paying 
royalties.
5
 What made this different from any college student ripping 
their favorite songs off of BitTorrent or Pirate Bay was that these 
sales were to be completely legal. How could that be? 
Antigua and Barbuda is the smallest member country of the WTO 
and for years hosted popular online gambling sites directed primarily 
at U.S. gamblers. In 2006, the United States enacted the Unlawful 
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA),
6
 making it illegal to 
offer online gambling in the United States. In response, Antigua and 
Barbuda brought a claim in the WTO that the United States was 
impermissibly restraining international trade in services in violation 
of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS). After 
several rounds of hearings and appeals, Antigua and Barbuda won the 
case. The typical remedy for a violation of GATS is permission for 
the aggrieved country to retaliate by enacting restraints or tariffs on 
services from the other country. 
Unfortunately, this remedy would not be very effective between 
the United States and Antigua and Barbuda. Why? For the simple 
reason that there is virtually no trade in services between the United 
States and Antigua and Barbuda. So even if Antigua and Barbuda 
could impose retaliatory tariffs of 1000 percent on services provided 
by the United States in Antigua and Barbuda, it would prove near 
meaningless. In response, the WTO permitted Antigua and Barbuda 
 
 4. See Press Release, Government of Antigua and Barbuda, Antiguan Government 
Announces Formation of WTO Remedies (July 17, 2013), http://www.ab.gov.ag/article_details 
.php?id=4294&category=38. 
 5. See Tim Worstall, Antigua’s Coming Legal Copyright Theft Site, FORBES, Jan. 25, 
2013, available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/01/25/antiguas-coming-legal-
copyright-theft-site/.  
 6. 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367 (2006). 
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to retaliate not under GATS but under the Agreement on Trade 
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). This is 
referred to as “cross-retaliation,” as the aggrieved member state is 
permitted to retaliate under one agreement for a violation of a 
different agreement under the purview of the WTO.
7
 In other words, 
Antigua and Barbuda could, perfectly legally, sell U.S. copyrighted 
material in the United States. 
In response, the United States was provided the opportunity to 
repeal the ban and comply with the WTO ruling. The United States 
declined, citing the ability under the WTO for member states to enact 
legislation for public morality. Instead, it appealed the decision to the 
Appellate Body of the WTO.  
The Appellate Body agreed in part with the United States that it 
did have a legitimate interest under GATS in furthering public 
morals. The problem was that the United States permitted inter-state 
gambling on horse racing through so-called “off-track betting” 
locations.
8
 Thus, at a minimum, the United States was discriminating 
against offshore gambling websites with respect to horse racing. 
Accordingly, the Appellate Body held that the public morals 
exception did not justify discrimination against offshore gambling 
with respect to horse racing.
9
  
The United States requested reasonable time to comply with this 
decision, but eventually Antigua sought permission to retaliate 
against the United States for failing to comply. At this remedy stage, 
the Dispute Settlement Body took into account the holding of the 
Appellate Body by limiting the right of Antigua to retaliate only to 
those lost profits attributable to horse racing, and not to all online 
gambling, such as poker and other card games.
10
 Thus, although 
 
 7. See infra note 29. 
 8. 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(D) (“The term ‘unlawful Internet gambling’ shall not include 
any activity that is allowed under the Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978 (15 U.S.C. 3001 et 
seq.).”). 
 9. See Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005), available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds285_e.htm [hereinafter Appellate Body 
Report]. See generally Mitchell E. Kilby, The Mouse That Roared: Implications of the WTO 
Ruling in US-Gambling, 44 TEX. INT’L L.J. 233 (2008). 
 10. See Decision by the Arbitrator, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border 
Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, Recourse to Arbitration by the United States under 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/10
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Antigua requested the ability to cross-retaliate in an amount up to $3 
billion per year, the WTO limited the Antigua retaliation to 
approximately $21 million per year.
11
 
Even at this relatively small annual amount, Antigua Gambling 
represented the first time the WTO ruled in favor of a specific form 
of cross-retaliation. Prior to Antigua Gambling, the mere threat of 
cross-retaliation had proven sufficient to result in a negotiated 
compromise between the countries.
12
 But in Antigua Gambling, the 
United States decided that the offending law was sufficiently 
important to its public policy as to be worth incurring the cost from 
cross-retaliation. Despite continued attempts at bilateral negotiations 
to avoid the implementation of the cross-retaliation, it appears as if 
Antigua and Barbuda will pursue its options to begin suspending 
obligations to protect U.S. intellectual property rights under TRIPS.
13
 
II. THE OECD BEPS PROJECT AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
What does Antigua Gambling have to do with international tax? 
One of the primary difficulties facing the international tax regime is 
the lack of reciprocity between large, developed countries and 
 
Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS285/ARB (Dec. 21 2007).  
 11. See id. 
 12. See Douglas Lerley, Defining the Factors that Influence Developing Country 
Compliance with and Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Another Look at the 
Dispute over Bananas, 33 L. & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 615 (2002). Although the WTO did approve 
of cross-retaliation by Ecuador against the European Union in the EC-Bananas III dispute, 
ultimately the dispute in that case was between the United States and the EU. Id. at 633–35. 
Thus, Antigua Gambling represents the first time a developing country on its own was granted 
permissible cross-retaliation against a developed country in the WTO. See Georgia Hamann, 
Note, Replacing Slingshots with Swords: Implications of the Antigua-Gambling 22.6 Panel 
Report for Developing Countries and the World Trading System, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
993 (2009). 
 13. See Press Release, Government of Antigua and Barbuda, Latest Meeting with the 
USTR Disappointing (Nov. 20, 2013), available at http://www.ab.gov.ag/article_details.php?id 
=4553&category=38 (“[T]here is no escaping the fact that this was a disappointing meeting, 
and that the USTR proposals fell far short of what is required to settle this matter.”); Press 
Release, Government of Antigua and Barbuda, Antigua and Barbuda’s WTO Remedies 
Implementation Committee (Oct. 23, 2013), available at http://www.ab.gov.ag/article_details 
.php?id=4503&category=38 (“Prime Minister Hon. Baldwin Spencer . . . observed that ‘in the 
face of the ongoing failure of the United States to negotiate with Antigua and Barbuda a 
reasonable settlement of this dispute, the implementation of trade remedies awarded by the 
WTO is an important international responsibility . . . .’”).  
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smaller, less-developed countries. In other words, why would 
countries between which there is little trade want to agree on a tax 
treaty lowering tax barriers to trade? But without a tax treaty, at least 
currently, there is no way for the United States to coordinate with 
another country to prevent multinational corporations from exploiting 
gaps in the international tax regime. So wealthier countries such as 
the United States want smaller countries to cooperate on tax 
enforcement matters, even if they do not want to enter into a tax 
treaty to do so.
14
 Understandably, however, many smaller countries 
have resisted cooperation on tax enforcement, especially if doing so 
would undermine what little economic or tax base they have in the 
first place. 
As evidenced by the BEPS project, the primary challenge to the 
functioning of the existing international tax regime is the abuse of 
transfer pricing. Transfer pricing is the primary means by which 
taxpayers and governments divide tax base between multiple 
countries in which a multinational taxpayer does business.
15
 
As a simple example, assume a company manufactures widgets in 
Country A and sells those widgets in Country B. It costs $200 to 
manufacture a widget in Country A, and it can be sold for $700 in 
Country B, for a total of $500 worldwide profit per widget. Which 
country is entitled to tax that $500? 
Of course, both Country A and Country B claim the right to tax 
the profit. Country A is where the widget was designed and 
manufactured, and Country B is where the widget was sold. The $500 
profit could not exist without both countries being involved. But what 
if both countries claim the power to tax the income? Assume each 
country imposes a tax of 20 percent on the total $500 profit, so that 
there is $100 tax owed to each country for a total of $200 tax. Now 
the company faces a choice. If it sells the widget in Country B, it 
results in $300 after-tax profit. If it sells the widget in Country A, 
however, it need only pay tax to Country A. So long as it can sell the 
 
 14. See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside the (Tax) Treaty, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 717 
[hereinafter Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside]. This has been evidenced by the rise of so-called 
“Tax Information Exchange Agreements” between such countries. 
 15. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the 
Evolution of U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89 (1995). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/10
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widget for one dollar more than $375, it will make more after-tax 
profit selling in Country A, because a 20 percent tax on $375 is $75, 
resulting in $300 after-tax profit. But Country B clearly values the 
widget more than Country A, since it is willing to pay $500 per 
widget.  
This is a simplified example of the so-called “double tax” 
problem.
16
 Double tax is considered undesirable because it distorts 
behavior and thus leads to deadweight loss. In the example, the 
deadweight loss comes from selling the widget to a Country A 
consumer that values it less than a Country B consumer. For this 
reason, most countries have unilaterally adopted some form of 
double-tax relief regimes.
17
   
There are two primary methods countries have adopted: 
(1) territorial exemption and (2) foreign tax credit.
18
 Under territorial 
exemption, as applied to the example, Country A simply would not 
tax income arising from sales in Country B. This clearly solves the 
double tax problem, since now only Country B would tax the income. 
Under the foreign tax credit, Country A would simply subtract any 
tax paid by the company to Country B from whatever amount of tax 
the taxpayer would owe to Country A. In the example, Country A 
would charge $100 in tax but subtract the $100 paid to Country B for 
a total of zero tax owed to Country A. 
There are complications in both territorial exemption and credit 
methods, but the basic idea is relatively simple and effective, and can 
be implemented unilaterally by any country wanting to relieve double 
taxation of cross-border trade. The problem, of course, is that the 
country granting relief is effectively sacrificing tax revenue as a 
result. For example, under a territorial exemption regime, Country A 
collects no tax revenue for sales made in Country B, and under a tax 
credit regime, Country A is reducing its tax revenue by the amount of 
taxes paid to Country B. Thus, there is a clear tradeoff between 
 
 16. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of US 
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021 (1997). 
 17. See id. 
 18. See, e.g., Paul R. McDaniel, Territorial vs. Worldwide International Tax Systems: 
Which is Better for the US, 8 FLA. TAX REV. 283 (2006). 
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worldwide efficiency in trade, on the one hand, and tax revenue, on 
the other. 
One solution would be for the countries to agree on how to divide 
the tax base between Country A and Country B, by treaty for 
example.
19
 For example, assume that both countries agreed that $100 
of the profit was attributable to manufacturing and $400 was 
attributable to sales. In that case, Country A would tax the $100 of 
profit and Country B would tax the $400 of profit. The total $500 
would be taxed only once, thus solving the double tax problem. 
The dominant mechanism used to divide worldwide income of 
multinational taxpayers under the current international tax regime is 
transfer pricing.
20
 Under transfer pricing, a hypothetical intermediate 
step is added to an inter-state transaction. In the example, transfer 
pricing would provide that the company be deemed to have sold the 
widget from Country A to a retail store in Country B for the 
wholesale price of the widget, with the retail store in Country B 
selling to the ultimate consumer for the final sales price. For 
example, assume the retail price was $300. The sale from Country A 
to Country B would generate $100 of profit, which Country A would 
tax. The retail store in Country B would have a profit of $400 from 
selling the widget it bought for $300 for $700. In other words, by 
setting an intermediate price for the goods, transfer pricing 
effectively divides the profit between Country A and Country B. 
The difficulty, of course, is choosing the proper “price” for the 
hypothetical intermediate transaction. The primary method adopted 
by most jurisdictions, including the United States, is typically 
referred to as the comparable uncontrolled price method (sometimes 
called the comparable sales method).
21
 Under this method, tax 
authorities look to the price at which the company sells widgets to 
third-party retail stores around the world and assumes this is what it 
would have charged a retail store in Country B, had it engaged in the 
hypothetical intermediate transaction. 
 
 19. See Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside, supra note 14. 
 20. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 15. 
 21. See ROBERT FEINSCHREIBER, TRANSFER PRICING METHODS: AN APPLICATIONS 
GUIDE ch. 5 (2004). 
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The comparable sales method works quite well for fungible, 
tangible goods. For example, if a company sells one barrel of oil for 
$100 at arms-length to a refinery, it is likely that all barrels of oil 
would sell for $100 to refineries. The comparable-sales method 
begins to fall apart, however, as the ability to identify comparables 
decreases; in particular, the comparable sales method is difficult to 
apply in the context of vertically integrated companies that sell 
primarily intellectual property-driven products.
22
 For example, what 
is the value of licensing the name Google from the United States to 
Germany when Google would never license that name to a third party 
under any circumstances? 
Instead, countries rely on taxpayers to report an initial transfer 
price for their goods and services. This, in turn, creates incentives for 
taxpayers to pick transfer prices that result in the most favorable tax 
result, rather than one that reflects the “true” arms-length price. 
Taken together, a significant concern has arisen over time that 
taxpayers are manipulating transfer pricing solely to minimize their 
worldwide tax liabilities.
23
 
Taken to an extreme, taxpayers could even report different 
transfer prices to different countries. This results in the problem of 
double non-taxation, or some of the income effectively being subject 
to tax in no country at all. Returning to the example, assume the 
taxpayer reports a transfer price of $300 to Country A but $600 to 
Country B. In such case, Country A would impose a tax on $100 of 
profit, and Country B would impose a tax on $100 of profit. The 
remaining $300 of real economic profit “disappears,” in that no one 
country is able to impose tax on that profit even it wanted to. 
One obvious solution to the resulting double-non taxation is for 
Country A and Country B to sign a treaty permitting their tax 
authorities to compare notes and force the taxpayer to use only one 
transfer price for both countries.
24
 Both Country A and Country B 
would have an incentive to do so, since they would both capture 
additional tax base. But what if a third country, Country C, was 
involved? Absent taxes, Country C would not be involved in the sale 
 
 22. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, supra note 15. 
 23. See OECD BEPS REPORT, supra note 1. 
 24. See Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside, supra note 14. 
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of the widget between Country A and Country B. But now the 
taxpayer has an incentive to funnel the sale of the widget through 
Country C, because doing so would permit the taxpayer to report 
different transfer prices to Country A and Country B. Further, since 
this is presumably valuable, the taxpayer would be willing to pay a 
fee to Country C to do so. 
Assume the taxpayer establishes a corporate subsidiary in Country 
C and sells the widget to Country C for $300. As between Country A 
and Country C, the taxpayer only earns $100 of profit. The Country C 
company now sells the widget to Country B for $600. As between 
Country B and Country C, there is also only $100 of profit. The 
remaining $300 of profit is now located in Country C. Why would 
the taxpayer want the profit to be located in Country C? Primarily 
because Country C has no income tax on the profits but instead 
charges a fee for the privilege of incorporating there. Unlike the 
previous case, there now is a country—Country C—with an incentive 
to assist the taxpayer in shifting profits out of Country A and Country 
B. Even worse, what if the taxpayer was able to report different 
transfer prices to Country C, as well (for example, if Country C has 
an unsophisticated revenue service)? In that case, the remaining $300 
of profit could actually end up “stateless,” with no country 
meaningfully able to tax it.
25
 
The problem is that now, neither Country A nor Country B can 
unilaterally or even working together capture the $300 tax base 
without risking double taxation. This is because neither Country A 
nor Country B can know whether the $300 is subject to tax or is in 
fact being taxed without asking Country C (or the taxpayer, which 
will be discussed below). Country C, however, has no incentive to 
share information with Country A or B, because doing so would 
cause it to lose the taxpayer’s franchise fees. Now, unlike in the 
bilateral situation, the countries involved do not have an incentive to 
cooperate to prevent taxpayers from escaping tax through transfer 
pricing.
26
 Put differently, double taxation can always solve double 
non-taxation—the only question is, which is worse? 
 
 25. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699 (2011).  
 26. See Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside, supra note 14, at 743–44. 
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All that is necessary for this phenomenon to hold is for there to be 
at least one country in the world that has a high need for revenue and 
that would otherwise not be able to attract investment other than 
through abetting tax avoidance.
27
 So long as there is at least one such 
country, then all of the countries that have difficulty attracting 
investment or generating a stable domestic revenue base will also 
have an incentive to engage in tax competition so as not to be left out. 
That leaves a world in which most wealthy countries with stable 
domestic tax bases and/or the ability to attract foreign investment 
have an incentive to work together to prevent transfer pricing abuse, 
while small, poorer countries have an incentive to assist taxpayers in 
avoiding wealthy country taxes. 
There are three potential ways to tackle such problems. First, 
wealthy countries could “crack down” on their own taxpayers by 
imposing large fines on companies that refuse to cooperate. Second, 
wealthy countries could “crack down” on the small, poorer countries 
serving as tax havens for wealthy taxpayers. Third, wealthy countries 
could create a multinational institution to force taxpayers and 
countries to cooperate with each other to prevent the use of tax 
havens. 
While all three potentially have the theoretical ability to work, in 
the real world, all three have been tried to combat transfer pricing 
abuse to little effect. While such efforts have proven more successful 
in the money laundering and tax evasion context, attempts to punish 
taxpayers or states that are perceived as engaging in improper transfer 
pricing activity have proven less than successful in eradicating 
competitive behavior. One argument raised to explain this is that, as 
punishment increases, the need for revenue in poor countries 
increases as well, only furthering the need to engage in even more 
harmful types of tax competition.
28
 
Regardless, there is a clear disconnect between the incentives of 
relatively wealthier countries that have an incentive to cooperate and 
want to do so through organizations such as the OECD, and relatively 
poorer ones that have an incentive to compete over taxes. Ultimately, 
 
 27. See Adam H. Rosenzweig, Why Are There Tax Havens?, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
923, 951 (2010). 
 28. See id. at 967. 
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it is this disconnect—and the resulting double non-taxation—that has 
led to the crumbling of the modern international tax regime and the 
call for a new institutional framework for international tax. 
III. AN ANTIGUA GAMBLING MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL TAX 
What lessons can be drawn from these two stories? In the tax 
context, it appears disparate incentives between some developed and 
developing countries have led to a breakdown in the international 
order. In the trade context, we observe a dispute between arguably 
the wealthiest and poorest member nations being resolved pursuant to 
the terms of the WTO treaties and within the institutional framework 
of the WTO. Why has the WTO framework been so successful when 
the international tax framework seems not to have been? Could the 
lessons from the WTO be incorporated into the BEPS project to solve 
this problem? 
The primary reason this disconnect arises is that the WTO 
institutional framework takes into account the disparate incentives of 
the developed and developing member nations in a manner that the 
international tax regime does not. Instead, the international tax 
regime continues to try to adopt a harmonized worldwide regime, 
which could be thought of as a one-size-fits-all approach. But if 
certain developing and developed countries cannot even agree on the 
normative starting point for the international tax regime, how can 
they agree on policing transfer pricing? Even worse, as noted above, 
only one country needs to defect from the regime for the entire 
system to unravel. Thus, the international tax system seems at an 
impasse. The primary thesis of this Essay is that, in building a new 
institutional framework, the international tax regime can learn from 
the recent experiences of the WTO in overcoming this impasse by 
balancing the interests of both developed and developing nations. 
So what would an international tax regime look like that would 
incorporate the lessons of Antigua Gambling? The clearest answer 
would be to build a dispute settlement mechanism into the BEPS 
project that permits a form of cross-retaliation such as that used in the 
WTO. In other words, the current BEPS project focuses on building a 
set of consistent international norms on transfer pricing and dividing 
the tax base of multinational corporations among countries. Without 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol44/iss1/10
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some mechanism to incorporate smaller countries that might have 
disparate incentives, however, this may not prove effective. The 
WTO cross-retaliation model could provide one such mechanism.  
Turning to the WTO cross-retaliation mechanism in particular, in 
relevant part, Article 22 of the dispute settlement understanding of 
the WTO provides:  
2. If the Member concerned fails to bring the measure found to 
be inconsistent with a covered agreement into compliance . . . 
such Member shall . . . enter into negotiations with any party 
having invoked the dispute settlement procedures, with a view 
to developing mutually acceptable compensation. If no 
satisfactory compensation has been agreed within 20 days after 
the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time, any party 
having invoked the dispute settlement procedures may request 
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the 
Member concerned of concessions or other obligations under 
the covered agreements. 
3. In considering what concessions or other obligations to 
suspend, the complaining party shall apply the following 
principles and procedures: 
 (a) the general principle is that the complaining party 
should first seek to suspend concessions or other obligations 
with respect to the same sector(s) as that in which the panel or 
Appellate Body has found a violation or other nullification or 
impairment; 
 (b) if that party considers that it is not practicable or 
effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with 
respect to the same sector(s), it may seek to suspend 
concessions or other obligations in other sectors under the 
same agreement; 
 (c) if that party considers that it is not practicable or 
effective to suspend concessions or other obligations with 
respect to other sectors under the same agreement, and that the 
circumstances are serious enough, it may seek to suspend 
concessions or other obligations under another covered 
agreement; 
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 (d) in applying the above principles, that party shall take 
into account: 
  (i) the trade in the sector or under the agreement under 
which the panel or Appellate Body has found a violation or 
other nullification or impairment, and the importance of such 
trade to that party; 
 (ii) the broader economic elements related to the 
nullification or impairment and the broader economic 
consequences of the suspension of concessions or other 
obligations;
29
 
There are two crucial aspects to cross-retaliation in the WTO context 
that would need to be amended to fit within the international tax 
context. First, the WTO is a dispute resolution body. Thus, there 
would need to be established some permanent dispute resolution 
body for international tax. While this may be difficult in practice, it is 
not difficult in theory and has been covered in other places, so this 
Essay will assume that away. Second, the retaliation in the WTO is 
intended to increase sales or profits for private actors in the 
complaining party country at the expense of competitors in the 
offending country, potentially leading to political pressure to repeal 
the offending law.
30
 In the tax context, however, the remedy would 
have to result in revenue for the government of the complaining 
country. 
It is for these two reasons that the WTO mechanism has typically 
been deemed insufficient for international tax.
31
 First, and primarily, 
as between countries that have not entered into tax treaties, there are 
no common norms to be violated. Thus, unlike in the WTO, there 
cannot be dispute resolution as to an underlying norm that does not 
 
 29. Amelia Porges, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations, 33 
I.L.M. 1125, 1239–40 (1994). 
 30. See, e.g., Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group 
Analysis, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1, 10 (2003). 
 31. See Rosenzweig, Thinking Outside, supra note 14, at 758–65.  
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exist, making the WTO model inapplicable to most international tax 
disputes.
32
 
In the specific context of BEPS, however, it might be possible to 
establish commonly accepted worldwide norms. In such a case, the 
primary hurdle to applying a WTO model to international tax—the 
lack of common norms—would be overcome. A WTO-type regime 
would remain difficult to translate into international tax, however, 
because as between asymmetric countries with little or no trade, there 
is no direct retaliation possible in the tax context. This is where an 
Antigua Gambling type model comes into play. 
For example, assume a world in which clear BEPS norms were 
established and agreed upon. What would happen if the United States 
adopted a rule unilaterally imposing a U.S. net income tax on income 
that should properly be allocated to the Cayman Islands under BEPS, 
such as income earned by Cayman entities with no U.S. business 
presence but with at least one U.S. shareholder?
33
 In retaliation, the 
Cayman Islands could impose a similar income tax on U.S. entities 
with no Cayman Islands presence but owned by at least one Cayman 
shareholder. Of course, the universe of such entities would 
presumably be quite small or even nonexistent. 
Similarly, assume the United States enacts an anti-tax haven law 
in direct contradiction to BEPS that imposes a net U.S. income tax on 
all non-U.S. subsidiaries of U.S. companies located in jurisdictions 
with no corporate income tax. As a result, all U.S. taxpayers with 
Cayman subsidiaries would liquidate their Cayman entities and 
reform them in another, permissible jurisdiction (say, Ireland). The 
Cayman Islands would lose significant revenue as a result of the fees 
that would have been charged to these entities. In response, the 
Cayman Islands could impose an income tax on all Cayman entities 
that have a U.S. subsidiary, but this would not be very effective for 
two reasons. First, there are likely few such companies. Second, to 
the extent there are such companies, they could easily move out of 
the Cayman Islands in response to such a tax. Thus, not only would 
retaliation not replace the lost revenue to the Cayman Islands, it could 
 
 32. See id. at 762. 
 33. While it may seem strange for a country to sign on to international norms and then 
intentionally violate them, that is precisely what occurred in Antigua Gambling.  
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actually hurt the Cayman economy by losing Cayman business to 
other jurisdictions. 
So it seems apparent that direct retaliation would not be 
particularly useful in the international tax context, even if a country 
such as the United States clearly violated agreed-upon norms 
embodied in BEPS. This presents a challenge to translating an 
Antigua Gambling model to international tax. The remainder of this 
section will consider some potential alternatives. 
A. Gross Withholding Tax and Tradeable Credits  
Assume three countries, A, B, and C, are all signatories to BEPS. 
Countries A and C are large countries and Country B is the small 
country. Country A adopts a rule treating companies legally formed 
in Country B as Country A domestic companies if there is a reason to 
believe the company is engaged in tax avoidance. Country A is ruled 
to be in violation of BEPS in adopting this rule, but it refuses to 
change the rule because it believes the rule is necessary to prevent 
abusive tax structuring. 
In response, Country B is permitted to cross-retaliate by imposing 
a gross withholding tax on all payments made by Country B 
companies subject to the Country A rule. Country B is able to collect 
the gross withholding tax because these companies are legally formed 
and actually located in Country B. Thus, as is typical with source-
based taxation, there is not a collection problem. As a result, Country 
B is able to replace some of its lost revenue.  
There is a double tax problem, however. Companies subject to the 
new Country A law will have to pay Country A net income tax and 
Country B gross withholding tax. Presumably such companies would 
not want to be located in Country B if they would have to pay 
Country A income tax and Country B withholding tax. The solution 
would be for Country A to grant a credit to the company for the 
withholding taxes paid to Country B. In this manner, the credit would 
act as a form of indirect revenue transfer, increasing revenue for 
Country B and lowering revenue for Country A.
34
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Notice what the combination of the gross withholding tax and the 
credit accomplishes. First, it permits Country A to enact a tax rule it 
thinks is important to its national interest, even if it is in violation of 
BEPS. This is substantially similar to what the United States did in 
Antigua Gambling. Second, Country A is permitted to raise revenue 
under this new tax rule. Third, the credit permits some of that revenue 
to be transferred from Country A to Country B, to offset any potential 
lost revenue from Country A enacting the new rule. Assuming that 
Country A—as the larger country—is able to impose a greater tax 
liability with less distortions than Country B, which is a standard 
assumption, this could also be efficiency enhancing. This, in turn, 
could mean that there actually could be more total revenue for both 
Country A and Country B. 
There could well be some technical problems that arise, but none 
of these should prove fatal to the proposal. For example, since the 
company, while legally formed and operated in Country B, is treated 
as a Country A company, all of its income may be considered 
“domestic source,” meaning the credit could not be used by the 
company. One way to resolve this problem would be to require 
Country A to permit the credit for Country B taxes as part of the 
dispute settlement system. However, if Country A refuses to comply 
with the dispute settlement system in the first place, it may not want 
to do so with respect to the credits either.  
This leads us to the harder issue—why would Country A comply 
with this at all? After all, Country A unilaterally violated BEPS in the 
first place by enacting the original law. There are two potential 
responses. First, historically, countries have tended to comply with 
WTO rulings even in the absence of a realistic threat of retaliation. 
For example, the United States complied with a WTO ruling 
requiring it to repeal a law mandating turtle protection devices on 
shrimping boats, even though the aggrieved countries, including 
Malaysia, could not realistically retaliate.
35
 So perhaps in the interest 
of maintaining international consensus, Country A would be willing 
 
 35. See Howard F. Chang, Toward a Greener GATT: Environmental Trade Measures and 
the Shrimp-Turtle Case, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 31 (2000). 
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to comply with the order and issue tax credits for Country B 
withholding taxes. 
Second, the credit could be made transferable to any BEPS 
member country. In this manner, even if Country A would not accept 
the tax credit, perhaps the company could sell its tax credit to a 
taxpayer in Country D. Even better, knowing this is possible could 
make it more likely that Country A would accept the credit in the first 
place, since not doing so would only hurt its own taxpayers. 
B. Extraterritorial Excise Tax and Extended Taxing Authority 
A second option would be to provide a complaining country with 
taxing authority over taxpayers within the territory of the offending 
country.
36
 Returning to the example, in response to Country A 
imposing its taxing authority over certain Country B corporations in 
violation of BEPS, Country B could impose a one-quarter percent 
excise tax on the income of all Country A corporations. From a 
revenue standpoint, the benefits of this approach are clear: Country B 
would be able to tax the larger Country A worldwide base and thus 
offset the revenue lost from Country A’s law. 
There are two difficult issues under this proposal, however. First, 
it would presumably be difficult for Country B to collect such a tax. 
Country A could be required to assist Country B in collecting such a 
tax, but if the countries could agree on tax collection, it is unlikely 
they would be in the dispute in the first place. An alternative would 
be for the other BEPS member countries to agree to assist Country B 
in collecting the excise tax. Thus, if a Country A corporation had no 
operations in Country B but did have operations in Country C, 
Country C could collect and remit the excise tax to Country B. Since 
Country C is not part of the dispute, presumably it would not oppose 
such assistance on the premise of maintaining the BEPS consensus. 
To the extent there were additional costs to Country C in doing so, 
such costs could be taken into account in setting the rate of the excise 
tax ex ante or could be added to the excise tax ex post.  
 
 36. But cf. Eric T. Laity, The Competence of Nations and International Tax Law, 19 DUKE 
J. COMP. & INT’L L. 187, 252–53 (2009). 
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Second, there remains the possibility of double taxation. Unlike 
with the gross withholding tax, however, this is less problematic. 
Assuming it could be collected, the tax would be a double tax on 
Country A corporations with no operations in Country B. Presumably 
Country A corporations would not like this and would lobby Country 
A to fix it. Country A could have two potential responses. First, 
Country A could repeal the offending law. This would remove the 
offensive provision and thus the right to cross-retaliate, meaning 
Country B would be required to repeal the excise tax. In return, 
Country B would regain the original tax base it lost due to Country A 
adopting the offending law in the first place. Alternatively, Country 
A could choose to keep the offending law and provide a credit to 
Country A taxpayers. As with the withholding tax, this would have 
the effect of transferring revenue from Country A to Country B, to 
offset the lost revenue due to the offending law. 
There are several benefits of the worldwide excise tax over the 
gross withholding tax. First, the revenue can be precisely calibrated, 
rather than turning on the happenstance of the timing of source 
payments. In other words, under a withholding tax, the complaining 
country would need to wait for payments of interest, dividends, or 
royalties actually to be made before the tax could be collected. Under 
the worldwide excise tax, this problem would not exist. Second, from 
a political economy standpoint, the tax is being felt by more Country 
A companies and thus could more likely lead to increased lobbying to 
repeal the offending law.
37
 Under the withholding tax scheme, only 
those companies with connections to Country B would be affected. 
Third, the worldwide excise tax is more reciprocal in that the 
offending law extends Country A taxing jurisdiction into Country B; 
so it seems appropriate for the remedy to be to permit Country B to 
extend its taxing authority into Country A.  
The tradeoff is the difficulty of collection. How that cost/benefit 
tradeoff is measured depends on how likely it might be for BEPS 
 
 37. But cf. Jide Nzelibe, The Case Against Reforming the WTO Enforcement Mechanism, 
2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 319, 323 (2008) (“[T]he challenge is not how to eliminate altogether the 
influence of interest groups in the WTO enforcement scheme, but rather how to develop a 
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countries to cooperate with a complaining country to collect the tax. 
If such countries would cooperate, the worldwide excise tax may well 
be superior to the gross withholding tax. If not, the converse would 
be true. 
C. Incorporate BEPS into the WTO 
The final and perhaps most radical solution would be to 
incorporate BEPS into the WTO institutional framework.
38
 This 
would prove difficult for the reasons stated above, primarily because 
the WTO addresses rules that are intended to increase private trade 
and not government revenue. That does not mean it would be 
impossible to incorporate tax disputes into the WTO, however.  
In fact, the WTO dispute settlement regime has already dealt with 
an international tax issue in the United States extraterritorial income 
(ETI) regime cases. In that set of cases, the United States adopted an 
income tax rule that effectively subsidized U.S. companies that 
exported goods to other countries.
39
 The WTO ruled that such a 
provision violated the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), notwithstanding that it was an income tax rule and not a 
tariff, because it subsidized U.S. exports at the expense of the exports 
of other countries. The WTO then authorized the EU to impose up to 
$4 billion per year in retaliatory tariffs on imports from the United 
States.
40
 Unlike in Antigua Gambling, however, the United States 
eventually complied and repealed the offending rules (although it 
took several losing cases in front of the WTO for the United States to 
do so).
41
 
As a technical matter, applying cross-retaliation in the context of 
the WTO would be the simplest of the three alternatives. Since 
Article 22 already exists, if BEPS were part of the WTO set of 
agreements, the WTO would be able to permit a complaining country 
 
 38. But cf. Laity, supra note 36, at 253–54. 
 39. See generally Paul R. McDaniel, The David R. Tillinghast Lecture Trade Agreements 
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 40. See generally Rosendo Lopez-Mata, Income Taxation, International Competitiveness 
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to cross-retaliate under any of the other WTO agreements for a 
violation of BEPS, such as permitting Country B to cross-retaliate 
under TRIPS for a violation of BEPS. This may always be the case in 
international tax because the first requirement of Article 22.3—that 
the complaining country first seek to retaliate under the tax 
agreement—will always be insufficient as between large and small 
countries. In fact, this may make cross-retaliation the norm with 
respect to violations of BEPS, as opposed to violations of other 
agreements in which it has been applied sparingly. 
The real difficulty in applying cross-retaliation in the context of 
the WTO is the public revenue aspect of international tax. Under the 
example, Country B’s complaint would be that the law adopted by 
Country A deprived Country B of revenue in violation of BEPS. 
Permitting residents of Country B to sell copyrighted songs in 
Country A without violating TRIPS does not replace this revenue, at 
least not directly. Rather, it leads to increased profits for residents of 
Country B. Alternatively, the WTO could permit tariffs on trade as 
retaliation, as it did in the ETI case, which would raise revenue. In 
the ETI case, however, the point of the tariff was to offset the 
impermissible trade subsidy, with the goal of encouraging the United 
States to repeal the offending provision. In fact, the amount of the 
tariff was calculated based on the lost trade to private actors in the 
EU, based on an assumed share of worldwide trade and not on any 
last revenue to EU member states.
42
 Thus, traditional retaliation 
methodologies utilized by the WTO would not respond to this 
revenue concern of international tax. 
This can be resolved, however, by applying an assumed tax rate to 
the assumed private gains from such sales. In fact, this is very similar 
to what the WTO did in the Antigua Gambling case itself. In that 
case, once it was clear that the United States was in violation and 
would not conform, the only issue up for debate was how much 
permissible retaliation was appropriate. Under the methodology of 
Article 22, the WTO created a counter-factual in which the United 
States did conform and then calculated how much profit Antigua 
would have earned. The main dispute between the United States and 
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Antigua was not over this methodology but rather over whether the 
counter-factual should be permitting unlimited offshore gambling 
websites or only offshore gambling websites for horse racing. 
Although the WTO agreed with the United States that only horse 
racing was the appropriate counter-factual, it permitted Antiguan 
sales of U.S. copyrighted material up to the amount of lost profits if 
offshore online horse racing gambling were permitted—$21 million 
per year. 
In the tax context, the same counter-factual approach could be 
adopted, but with an assumed tax rate applied. Assume Country B 
establishes that it lost $100 million of tax revenue due to the law 
adopted by Country A, and that the Country B tax rate is 10 percent. 
The next step is simply to divide the $100 million by 10 percent—
that is, $1 billion—to establish how much in profits Country B 
taxpayers can make by selling Country A copyrighted material.  
Not only does this solve the problem mathematically, it may 
actually make cross-retaliation more effective than in other contexts. 
In the Antigua Gambling context, the United States was able to 
protect U.S.-based remote gambling on horse racing by sacrificing 
$21 million per year in sales of copyrighted material. If the benefits 
of such protection were greater than $21 million to the horse racing 
gambling industry, this would be a net positive for the United States. 
But in the tax context, Country A would be collecting additional 
revenue from U.S. taxpayers by adopting the offending law at the 
expense of costing other U.S. business $1 billion in sales annually. 
Assuming the owners of copyrighted songs and books in Country A 
would not be too interested in paying $1 billion a year in a de facto 
tax solely to permit Country A to impose a separate tax under the 
offending law, this would lead to pressure to repeal the offending 
law—precisely the intended goal of cross-retaliation under Article 
22.
43
 
However, unlike in the typical WTO context, repeal of the 
offending law need not necessarily be the ultimate goal of tax cross-
retaliation. The reason is that taxes are just money, and BEPS is an 
understanding on how to divide that money among states. Any lost 
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tax revenue arising from a violation of BEPS can therefore be 
completely replaced by substitute tax revenue generated by the cross-
retaliation. So long as the complaining country ends up with at least 
the same amount of revenue before and after the adoption of the 
offending provision, there would no longer necessarily be a violation 
of an international tax norm under BEPS. Unlike in the trade context, 
where the goal is to return to the more economically efficient open 
trading regime, in the tax context, the remedy may itself be the new 
regime. In this manner, cross-retaliation could actually help stabilize 
the emergence of a new international consensus rather than 
destabilize it. 
Incorporating BEPS into the WTO would also increase the cost of 
failure to comply. If BEPS were a stand-alone regime, the only 
consequence of disregarding BEPS would be the collapse of BEPS. 
But if BEPS were part of the WTO, disregarding BEPS could 
potentially lead to the unraveling of GATT, GATS, and/or TRIPS. To 
the extent these agreements are important to a particular country, 
BEPS could “piggy-back” on them as a way of solidifying BEPS as 
an international norm. Cross-retaliation would only increase this 
benefit, since it would inexorably tie together these regimes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
As the countries of the world continue to confront the challenges 
facing tax law in the next century, new models for an institutional 
framework for international tax become increasingly crucial to any 
success. While significant progress has been made in furthering 
underlying norms to serve as the basis for a modern international tax 
regime, less focus has been paid to building the institutions and 
structures necessary to implement these norms. To this end, this 
Essay proposes looking to the recent experience of the WTO in the 
Antigua Gambling case as a model for the new international tax 
regime. By balancing the needs of both larger, wealthier countries 
and smaller, poorer ones, the Antigua Gambling model could help 
overcome one of the largest obstacles confronting the modern 
international tax regime. Perhaps an Antigua Gambling model could 
serve as the basis for the beginning of a new institutional framework 
for international tax. 
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